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Abstract
Both sides of a two-sided market are usually modeled as markets without product
di®erentiation. Often however, it will be pro¯t maximizing to di®erentiate one or two
sides in two or more types. In a simple theoretical model, inspired by Yellow Pages,
we show that this decision crucially depends on the appreciation of these di®erentiated
types by the other side. We argue that this consists of two parts: ¯rst, a preference for
informative advertisement by users and second, the e®ect of persuasive advertisements
on users. The relation between both e®ects drives the monopolist decision to engage
in product di®erentiation.
We test this conceptual framework in an empirical investigation of Yellow Pages.
We ¯nd that Yellow Pages publishers o®er large ads even though users don't value
them at all. The economic rationale for this is that each advertisement type contributes
directly (by the price paid for it) and indirectly (by increased usage) to revenues. Large
ads are mainly set for this direct contribution, small ads for this indirect contribution.
If a platform can choose the size, it will make the size di®erence between small and
large ads as large as possible, in order to attract as much users as possible, but also
to induce self selection among advertisers.
Keywords: two-sided markets, product di®erentiation, Yellow Pages, advertising
JEL Codes: D42, L12, L86
1 Introduction
Two-sided markets are mostly presented in a standard way: one or more platforms, two
di®erent demand sides and all members of each side join the platform receiving the same
value proposition. But why not focus on product di®erentiation in these markets, i.e. why
could members of each side not join the platform in a di®erent way? Often, a platform
can obtain a higher pro¯t if it di®erentiates one or two sides in two or more types.
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demands: users searching for a good or service and ¯rms announcing their goods or service
to potential users. Both sides value each other's presence at the platform. A publisher
can choose to o®er an undi®erentiated product, i.e. each side joins the platform in the
same way. This is not what we observe in reality. Advertisers can select one out of many
possibilities to join the platform: there are several advertisement types, di®erentiated by
size, color and graphical elements.
We set up a simple model, presented as a Yellow Pages model for the ease of using
that terminology, but can easily be applied to other markets. This model contains product
di®erentiation on one side of the market: advertisers can choose a small or a large ad.
These small and large ads are di®erentiated on two dimensions: their informative and
persuasive content. We assume that large ads are more persuasive than small ads, i.e. if
a user opens the directory, it is likelier that he will contact a ¯rm that placed a large ad.
On the informative side, we leave it open whether small ads or large ads are perceived as
the more informative. One can argue that large ads contain more information, but they
also contain more noise. Therefore the informative di®erence can go in both directions.
The monopoly platform is a quantity setter. In his decision on both the quantity of small
and large ads, he faces two constraints: quantities cannot be negative and he cannot place
more quantities than there are ¯rms. If none of these constraints is binding, he o®ers both
types and both are generating pro¯t. But if the non-negativity constraint is binding, he
decides to o®er only one type. This replicates the setup of many theoretical papers and
some real life examples where no di®erentiation takes place. The platform also can decide
to include every ¯rm, by giving the smallest ads away for free.
Which result prevails is crucially determined by how these types are welcomed by each
side of the market. When the users decide whether to join the platform or not, it is
the informative role that matters. The persuasive role comes in only after one side has
decided to join the platform. Once they are on the platform, it is not the information
that counts, but the persuasion of the di®erent types. The other side of the market,
the advertisers, choose under which type they join the platform and are a®ected by both
e®ects: the informative role determines how many users join; the persuasive role tells how
large their chance is to be chosen once the users have joined. Since an individual advertiser
cannot a®ect the aggregate information of the platform, its decision is mainly based on
the persuasion role.
Whether the platform decides to o®er di®erentiated types, or only one single type,
is determined by the interplay of both roles. If large ads contribute strongly to usage
(information) while users see them similar to smaller ads (persuasion), then the platform
will o®er only large ads to advertisers. If large ads do not contribute to the use of the
directory but users do look at them, then small and large ads will ¯gure next to each
other. If the persuasion di®erence is large, then every ¯rm is on the platform and small
ads will not be charged.
In the empirical investigation of Yellow Pages in Europe, we isolate the informative
and persuasive role. We ¯nd that readers use the directory because it contains listings
and small ads; but the number of large ads does not have an e®ect on readership. It then
seems puzzling why 18% of the ¯rms buys a large ad. Our theoretical model correctly
predicts that even though no one likes large advertisements, the directory includes them
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other media platforms and other two-sided markets, such as shopping malls, job agencies,
auction platforms and other advertisement-related platforms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we relate our approach with
the literature. In Section 3, we introduce our theoretical model. We present a simple model
and compute the optimal quantities of a pro¯t maximizing monopolist. Further we discuss
some extensions, such as the optimal quantities of a welfare maximizing monopolist, price
discrimination and endogenous size choice. The proofs of all propositions are relegated to
the Appendix. Section 5 describes the industry study. We collected data on Yellow Pages
publishers in ¯ve small European countries and test which advertisements are valued by
Yellow Pages readers. Further, we reconcile empirical ¯ndings with theory. Finally, we
conclude in Section 6.
2 Related Literature
The double e®ect of the informative and persuasive role of advertising is relevant in markets
with product di®erentiation and network externalities. If there is no product di®erenti-
ation, then there are no types to compare. The presence of two distinctive sides of the
market allows information and persuasion to have a double perception by the other side of
the market. We discuss two-sidedness and product di®erentiation below and relate them
to the literature. We illustrate both characteristics with the example of Yellow Pages, be-
cause this makes it easier to link the theoretical model to the empirical analysis in section
5. However, ¯rst we start with a short discussion on the informative versus persuasive
role of advertising.
The di®erence between both roles has been subject of discussion in economics and
marketing for years (for an overview, see Bagwell (2007). This discussion focused on
the competitive e®ects of both advertisements types, arguing that persuasive ads are
anti-competitive (Kaldor 1950) and informative ads are pro-competitive (Telser 1964).
We refrain from this discussion and do also not discuss whether advertisements change
preferences. We only use the terminology to describe the potential e®ects of advertisements
on users. On the one hand, they watch advertisements for their informative content, but on
the other hand, they are also in°uenced by the persuasive content. Since the information
e®ect plays a role at the level of the directory, i.e. in deciding whether to use the directory
or not, other terms for this e®ect are aggregate or composition e®ect. The persuasive
e®ect comes in at the page level, i.e. after one has decided to open the directory, and can
therefore be labeled relative or comparison e®ect.
Two-Sidedness In two-sided markets, platforms bring together two distinctly di®erent
customers who value each other's presence on the platform. Examples are credit cards
(bringing together merchants and customers), operating systems (software developers and
end users), shopping malls (sellers and buyers) and media outlets (readers and advertisers).
Yellow Pages can be seen as a particular type of a media outlet.
Issuers of Yellow Pages target two clearly distinct groups: users and advertisers. For
users, Yellow Pages is a device to ¯nd businesses. Though there are a number of alter-
natives, e.g. word-of mouth or company websites, Yellow Pages are still extensively used
3for their convenience. For advertisers, Yellow Pages is a device to reach potential clients.
Especially for smaller ¯rms who lack the possibility of direct marketing, Yellow Pages are
a valuable device. It is clear that both sides are interdependent: advertisers value eyeballs
(i.e. the looks their ads get) while the users of the Yellow Pages value information on the
suppliers that ¯gure in each book entry.
Rysman (2004) examines the Yellow Pages market in the United States. He uses data
on 419 directories for the year 1996. He estimates a simultaneous model on both sides of
the market. The conclusion of his research is that there is a statistically and economically
signi¯cant positive feedback loop e®ect. The willingness to pay of advertisers increases if
there are more users and usage increases if there are more advertisers in a directory. This
creates the feedback loop between advertisers and users: more ads means more users which
in turn increases the number of ads. This result favors a monopolistic market situation
because it generates a larger welfare surplus through the internalization of the network
e®ect. But, more providers reduce market power, and therefore they are also a force that
generates welfare surplus. His empirical study reveals that the latter e®ect dominates,
therefore, from a welfare viewpoint, a more competitive market is preferable. For the
empirical model, we rely on the structural framework of Rysman (2004), but we do not
investigate the competition issue because pronounced consolidation already has induced
one operator per country in Europe.
Rochet & Tirole (2003) include both network theory and multi-product pricing to build
their seminal two-sided market model. They investigate the price allocation between the
two sides of the market under a (monopolistic) platform and under two (competitive)
platforms. They discuss the implications of pro¯t vs. welfare maximization. Armstrong
(2006) focuses on a similar analysis as Rochet & Tirole (2003). In his theoretical model,
he mainly stresses the single versus multi-homing behavior of the market. If there are
several platforms, both demand types can decide to join just one or di®erent platforms. A
characteristic example in his article is when one side of the market single homes (=joins
just one platform) whereas the other side multi-homes. To some extent, the newspaper
market is such a market: most readers buy only one newspaper, but many advertisers buy
advertisement space in several papers. Armstrong (2006) shows that the bottleneck side
(the single-homing side) is cross-subsidized by the multi-homing side. In the Yellow Pages
market, users pay no fee and are therefore subsidized, though that is not necessarily the
consequence of single/multihoming behavior.
We start from a simple two-sided markets model, but we remove some features and
add some other. We remove the bottleneck discussion by assuming that there is but one
supplier. This is true for Yellow in many Europeans countries. Also, we assume that one
side doesn't pay to use the platform, which equally ¯ts with reality in Yellow Pages since
users don't pay. Modeling a null price is equivalent with a relative high elasticity for the
reader side. To the two-sided markets model, we add product di®erentiation.
Product di®erentiation Product di®erentiation is a well-known strategy to distinguish
a product from a competitor's product, or from the own product. There are two types
of product di®erentiation. Horizontal di®erentiation serves other tastes but keeps the
same quality (e.g. a white versus a red car). In our model, we focus on vertical product
di®erentiation. Products then di®er in quality, e.g. large ads are more interesting for
4advertisers because they attract more viewers. In this sense, product di®erentiation can
also be labeled quality di®erentiation.
Within platforms, product di®erentiation can take place at two levels: at the demand
sides of the market and at the platform level. Product di®erentiation on the demand
sides is implicitly assumed in almost all two-sided markets articles. Especially in two-
sided markets where unique matching takes place, such as dating markets, employment
agencies and real estate, the number of customers on the other side of the market would
be irrelevant if all those customers would be undi®erentiated, i.e. just one customer would
su±ce to have the best match possible. Though, the number of customers on the other
side is appreciated for its variety, resulting in a potentially better match1. Hagiu (2009)
focuses on this implicitly assumed but often neglected aspect of variety. If the taste for
variety among buyers is greater, then pro¯ts will be more extracted from the seller side.
The reasoning behind this ¯nding is that a strong taste for variety reduces the competition
among sellers2.
The second form of di®erentiation in two-sided markets happens at the platform level.
We distinguish two types: di®erentiation between platforms and di®erentiation on plat-
forms. Armstrong (2006) and Rochet & Tirole (2003) di®erentiate platforms on a Hotelling
line, with accompanying transport costs for both demands of the platform. This generates
a di®erentiation between the platforms, but not on the platform. All users are o®ered the
same product, though it is di®erently valued by consumers due to the transport cost.
Our model tackles di®erentiation on the platform. The advertisement side is di®eren-
tiated on the platform, but the main di®erence between our model and previous literature
is that the other side of the market can directly choose between both types of advertisers
on the same platform, i.e. they do not have to multihome to connect with both types.
This di®erentiation is common to all Yellow Pages editions. Even casual inspection of a
directory shows that di®erent types of advertisements ¯gure next to each other. Some are
large ads in color that contain a lot of persuasive elements. Other entries merely have the
contact details of the business involved. Advertisers are o®ered a menu of advertisements
and can freely choose the advertisement which maximizes their utility. The interesting
questions here are how advertisers self select their ad type and to what extent usage
matters in this decision. It is also interesting to investigate how and to what extent types
of advertisement a®ect usage.
Busse & Rysman (2005) investigate the e®ect of competition on second-degree price
discrimination in the Yellow Pages market. With roughly the same data set as Rysman
(2004), they ¯nd that competition does not only a®ect the price level, but also the price
curvature. Their results suggest that the price of large ads is more a®ected by competition:
in regions with only one player, the largest ad is 13.51 times more expensive than the
1Take the example of Rochet & Tirole (2003). The number of merchants determines the welfare of
buyers because they have a bene¯t each time they pay with plastic. Note that this number would be
irrelevant if all shops are considered as the same, since on shop would su±ce to do all purchases.
2Galeotti & Moraga-Gonz¶ alez (2009) also explicitly model the issue that both sides are di®erentiated
and search for the best match. They focus on the potentially detrimental e®ect of an increase of own side
members. If the variety increases, then it is also likelier that there will be a closer competitor, therefore
competition is harsher. If there is an outside option, e.g. selling directly without intermediation, then this
might sometimes be bene¯cial. This own-side e®ect externality is often labeled as a congestion e®ect. For
a further discussion see section 4.7
5smallest ad, compared to 12.54 and 11.63 in regions with two or three players, respectively.
Similarly, an additional competitor triggers a decrease in the price for a full-page ad of
12.8%, for smaller ads this is substantially less (double quarter-column ad and quarter-
column ad: 7.7% resp. 5.9%). Busse & Rysman (2001) provide three reasons for this
observation. First, since new entrants have a capital constraint, they may seek out the
most pro¯table sales which are the largest ads. Second, large advertisers have greater
bargaining power (Rochet & Stole 2002); therefore they reap the largest bene¯ts from
competition. Finally, given the existence of a feedback loop e®ect, directories with more
larger advertisement can get higher usage3.
There are a number of theoretical papers that allow for quality di®erentiation on at
least one side of the market. Viecens (2006) presents a model inspired by shopping malls.
There are two types of shops, di®erentiated by quality. For the other side of the market,
buyers, not only the volume but also the identity of the shops matters. The relative size of
the quality e®ect versus the quantity e®ect determines whether the duopolistic platforms
will both engage in attracting low or high quality shops. If the network e®ects are weak
vis-µ a-vis the reputation e®ect, only one platform will be active in the market. Otherwise,
the market structure will be duopolistic with two platforms that might be asymmetric
in their attraction of only low types, only high types or both. We do not allow for
competition in our model since it would probably blur the interesting insights that result
from the potential di®erence between the informative and persuasive role. Another major
di®erence with Viecens (2006) is that we allow the di®erentiated side to self select their
types.
In Damiano & Li (2007), a monopoly matchmaker di®erentiates both sides, men and
women, in many types by setting a schedule of prices. The matchmaker uses price discrim-
ination to allow men and women to select their optimal type, which generates an e±cient
matching process. They argue that di®erentiation is better than the uniform pricing that
is used in online dating markets. Price is used as a signal and mitigates the misrepresenta-
tion in markets with uniform pricing. Our model is similar to their model to some extent
since we also model the platform as a monopolist4 and we also allow the di®erentiated side
to self select their type. Though, we do not model the potential inference of quality by a
price mechanism. This inference would be perfectly possible in Yellow Pages: companies
where large advertisements might signal that they are more e±cient than the others. On
the other side, the better companies might also want to attract the better customers which
would replicate the matchmaking of Damiano & Li (2007). We refrain from this signalling
possibility for two reasons. First, if one side cannot be charged, as is the case in Yellow
Pages, then it is hard to di®erentiate on this side. Therefore, all users will connect with
the largest advertisers and hence di®erentiation will also disappear at the advertiser side.
Our theoretical model con¯rms this presumption. Second, we allow for cases where large
is not always better, given the negative externality it might impose on the whole directory.
3This last explanation contradicts with both our theoretical and empirical ¯ndings. If larger ads are
more popular than smaller ads, then the directory will only publish large ads. Empirically we ¯nd a strong
positive e®ect on usage from small ads, but no e®ect from large ads.
4Interestingly, in their accompanying paper Damiano & Li (2008), they compare the results of monopoly
with competition. They ¯nd that while monopolistic match makers can use prices to sort high types from
low types, their duopolistic counterparts are involved too much in price competition and therefore they
are less e±cient.
6This key feature of our model is not incorporated in the assortative matching model of
Damiano & Li (2007).
With the theoretical model, we contribute to the already extensive literature on two-
sided markets, by adding product di®erentiation. Besides the e®ect of this di®erentiation
on the di®erentiated side of the market (by inducing self selection), we explicitly investigate
the e®ect of this di®erentiation on the other side of the market. We argue that the
other side has a direct preference for one type over another and an indirect preference
for the contribution of each type to the composition of the platform. It is exactly the
potential di®erence between both e®ects that determines the equilibrium outcome. To our
knowledge, we are the ¯rst authors that exploit this feature to investigate the e®ect of
product di®erentiation in two-sided markets.
Our contribution is not only novel in a theoretical perspective. Empirical studies
on Yellow Pages are scarce; and none of them contain all the features described above.
Rysman (2004) investigates two-sidedness but excludes product di®erentiation. Busse
& Rysman (2005) do take into account product di®erentiation but exclude readers (and
therefore two-sidedness). In our industry study, we focus on both, though we are mostly
interested in what readers like.
3 Theoretical Model
Our theoretical model is presented as a Yellow Pages model, but is more general and
can easily be applied to other markets as well. We merely do so because of the ease of
explanation.
3.1 Set-Up
The Yellow Pages industry is characterized by three players: advertisers, readers and
publishers. Advertisers are retailers or companies that use the directory to connect with
users in order to sell their products or services. Readers are consumers that use the
directory to connect with advertisers in order to buy their products or services. The
publisher is the platform that connects readers and advertisers.
Our analysis is focused on the last player, the platform. We assume that the platform
is a quantity setter5 and investigate the quantity decision of a monopolistic platform: how
many small and large ads will be published in the directory?
Readers Yellow Pages readers get the directory for free, but that does not mean that
every potential reader will use it. Readers use the directory if it generates more utility
than the outside option to search for a good or service. This can include contacting a
company one already knows, calling a friend, or driving to a city and searching randomly
for retailers. If we treat this outside option as an opportunity cost, the net utility of using
the directory is equal to:
UR = max(r1q1 + r2q2 ¡ k;0) (1)
5While publishers have a tradition of announcing list prices each year, the practice learns that they
adjust these prices with discounts to accommodate the number of advertisers, i.e. list prices can be seen
as maximum prices but can di®er substantially from the real prices.
7where q1 are the small ads, q2 are the large ads and k is the opportunity cost. The
parameters r1 and r2 represent the valuation of readers for the informative contribution of
each ad type. Readers are homogenous in these valuations but are heterogeneous in their
opportunity cost. If there is a mass one of potential readers and the opportunity cost k is
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, then the number of readers reads:
qR = r1q1 + r2q2 (2)
A directory without advertisements will have no readers.
Advertisers Firms, i.e. potential advertisers, value looks at their advertisement since
they generate pro¯t ¼ from each look. The number of looks for each ad depends on the
size6 of the ad si and the number of readers:
L1 = s1qR
L2 = s2qR (3)
We assume that large ads attract more readers than small ads (s2 > s1)7. Further we
assume that each ¯rm buys at most one ad. Contrary to readers, advertisers pay a price
p to use the platform. The net bene¯t of an advertiser reads:
¼Li ¡ pi (4)
with i = 1;2 the type of ads. Advertisers are of mass one and are heterogeneous in their
pro¯t per look ¼ which is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. De¯ne ^ ¼ ´
p2¡p1
L2¡L1 to
be the pro¯t level where ¯rms are indi®erent between both ad types, and ^ ¼1 ´
p1
L1 is the
lowest pro¯t for which the ¯rm's net bene¯t is positive. Then
q1 = ^ ¼ ¡ ^ ¼1
q2 = 1 ¡ ^ ¼ (5)
Since we model the platform as a quantity setting monopolist, we transform the demand
functions to inverse demand functions:
p1 = (1 ¡ q1 ¡ q2)L1
p2 = (1 ¡ q2)L2 ¡ q1L1 (6)
Publisher The platform maximizes its pro¯t:
¦ = p1q1 + p2q2 (7)
6Both parameters s1 and s2 stand for size. We relate size directly to persuasion, i.e. the larger the size,
the larger the persuasion e®ect. Throughout the remainder of the analysis, we use the term size, which
can equally be read as persuasion. Note that it can also be interpreted as salience, as in the framework
of Haan & Moraga-Gonzalez (2009). Salience is the chance that a certain ¯rm is remembered. Similar to
persuasion, it increases pro¯t.
7This assumption can be made without loss of generality. If it would be the case that small ads attract
more attention than large ads, then small ads can be relabeled q2 and large ads q1.
8To simplify the analysis, we assume that the platform has no costs, i.e. there is no cost
di®erence between small and large ads8. The platform is a quantity setting monopolist, so
it optimizes its pro¯t with respect to the quantities q1 and q2. While deciding on these two
variables, a platform has to take into account the direct and indirect e®ects of quantity
level and structure. The e®ect of an increase in quantity on pro¯t depends on the decrease
in prices. This problem is complicated by product di®erentiation. Another indirect e®ect
is the e®ect of quantity on usage. An increase in the number of ads increases the number
of readers and therefore increases the willingness to pay. This e®ect, the feedback loop
e®ect, reduces the negative price e®ect.
3.2 Results for a Private Monopolist
In this section, we present the results of the model for a private monopolist. In order to
clearly present these optimal decisions, we de¯ne three new parameters: r = r1
r2, R = r1+r2
and s = s1
s2 Thus r is the relative appreciation of q1 versus q2 (i.e. the informative e®ect),
whereas s is the relative attention-attraction of q1 versus q2 (i.e. the persuasive e®ect).
We replace r1, r2 and s1 to obtain expressions that contain only r, R, s and s2
9. The
platform's pro¯t function is maximized subject to the constraints q1;q2 ¸ 0 and q1+q2 · 1.
Proposition 3.1 There are four possible outcomes for a monopoly platform:
1. Large ads only platform
2. Small ads only platform
3. Full coverage platform (i.e. everyone advertises)
4. Di®erentiated platform (i.e. small and large ads o®ered at a positive price)
The solutions depend on the relation between r and s, but not on R and r2. These results
will prevail, respectively, when:
1. r < s
2. 3
4 < s < 1 and r ¸ s
4s¡3
3. s < 1






From these solutions, we can easily deduct some possible scenarios.
Corollary 3.2 r-scenarios
² if r1 < r2, then the platform always o®ers large advertisements
² if r2 < r1, then the platform always o®ers small advertisements
² if r2 = r1, then the platform always o®ers both advertisements
8For a discussion of this assumption, see section 4.7




1+r and s1 by ss2.
9Figure 1: Di®erent solutions in the r-s-space.
s-scenarios
² if s · 3
4, then the platform always o®ers large advertisements
² if s ¸ 1
4, then advertisements are always paid (i.e. never for free)
Figure 1 shows these scenarios graphically in the r-s-space. As can be seen, the boundaries




1¡4s , and between solutions 4 and 2,
r = s
4s¡3, go asymptotically to 1
4 and 3
4.
Performing a comparative statics analysis, allows us to formulate three interdependent
statements on the impact of R and s2, r and s on the equilibrium quantities and pro¯t.
Proposition 3.3 ² The levels of the parameters (e.g. R, s2) a®ect the pro¯t posi-
tively, but do not a®ect the optimal quantities.
² The proportion of r1 to r2 (=r) does a®ect the optimal quantities, but only in the
full coverage and di®erentiated optimum. The bigger r1 relative to r2, the higher the
amount of small ads and the lower the amount of large ads.
² The proportion of s1 to s2 (=s) does a®ect the optimal quantities, but only in the
di®erentiated optimum. If r1 is substantially larger than r2, an increase in s increases
q1 and decreases q2. If r1 is smaller than r2, an increase in s decreases q1 and
increases q2.
An important remark on these comparative statics is that the e®ect of r and s does
not play only within these solutions, but also a®ects which solution is optimal. A change
in r or s can induce a solution shift. This can be easily seen in ¯gure 1.
4 Extensions to the Model
4.1 Negative Utility from Advertisements
In section 3, we implicitly assumed that r1 and r2 are positive though it is likely that in
some markets this assumption is violated. Especially in media markets, advertisements
10Figure 2: Di®erent Solutions in the r ¡ s-space. Left panel: if r < 0, then r1 < 0, right
panel: if r < 0, then r2 < 0
are often seen as a nuisance (Anderson & Coate (2005) and Peitz & Valletti (2008)).
In Yellow Pages, this is less likely since advertisements contain relevant information for
users, though it might be that some advertisement types do not contribute to usage, on
the contrary, they decrease usage (see section 5.3 for a discussion).
In our model, it should hold that at least one of the advertisement types contributes to
usage, i.e. either r1 or r2 is positive. Otherwise there would be no usage on the platform.
But the model can perfectly cope with one negative parameter (either r1 < 0 or r2 < 0).
Proposition 4.1 ² If r1 < 0 and r2 > 0, then the platform only o®ers large adver-
tisements.
² If r2 < 0 and r1 > 0, then the platform always o®ers small advertisements. The
platform will also o®er large advertisements if the size di®erence is large enough.
This proposition is visualized in ¯gure 2. In the left panel, below the x-axis, we
plotted the case where r1 < 0; on the right panel the case where r2 < 0. As be seen from
the graphs, the border r < s extends to negative values of r as well in the case where
r1 < 0. Since small ads are less pro¯table and are disliked by users, they do not appear
any more in the directory. In the case r2 < 0, things are somewhat more complicated.
The platform will keep out the large advertisements only if s is large; more precisely if
r > s
4s¡3 (and for all r-values if r < 0 and 3






4.2 Endogenizing r (as a function of s1 and s2)
The persuasive e®ect s and the informative e®ect r were treated independently in section
3, though one can argue that they are related. In our Yellow Pages example, we argued
that users might more easily choose a large advertisement when they compare both types.
Though when deciding on using the directory or not, users might prefer smaller ads because
these ads use less space for the information provided. Therefore, it makes the directory
11Figure 3: Di®erent solutions in the v-s-space.
easier to handle and provides a better overview. We linked the persuasive e®ect directly
to size. One can argue that the informative preference is also related to the size. After
all, it is exactly the size of the advertisements that often blurs the informational value of
an ad. Therefore, we can change usage equation 2 in order to include this nuisance e®ect
of size.
qR = v(q1 + q2) ¡ n(s1q1 + s2q2) (8)
The ¯rst term, with parameter v, captures the taste for variety, i.e. the pure network
externality of adding another advertiser to the platform. The second term, with parameter
n, captures the nuisance of the thickness of the directory. To simplify the analysis, we
normalize n to 1. Note that we can rewrite equation 8 as qR = (v ¡ s1)q1 + (v ¡ s2)q2,
i.e. r1 = v ¡ s1 and r2 = v ¡ s2. The ratio r is equal to v¡ss2
v¡s2 . Since s1 < s2, r1 > r2
always holds. Therefore, we can use the right panel of ¯gure 2 to analyse the evolution of
the equilibrium r-ratio.
Proposition 4.2 ² If v · s1, there will be no platform since there are no users.
² In all other cases, the platform will o®er small ads. If s1 < v · 4s1
3 , then the




¡1+5s , then the platform
implements the full coverage solution. If 4s1




¡1+5s , then the
platform is di®erentiated.
In ¯gure 3, the outcomes are shown in function of v and s. The straight line is the
size of the large advertisement s2. Three out of the four solution of the model in section 3
persist in this adapted model. In addition, if the taste for variety is not su±ciently large,
then there will be no platform on the market. The claim that the absolute size of the
advertisements does not matter in the choice of the quantities does not hold anymore.
Proposition 4.3 If size acts as a nuisance factor to the informational value of the plat-
form, then an increase in s2 will lead to an increase in small advertisements and a decrease
in large advertisements.
12This proposition holds for solutions 3 and 4 (full coverage and di®erentiated platform).
In the case where only one ad type is o®ered, none of the parameters a®ect the solution.
Note that an increase in s2 can also induce a shift between the solutions and makes it
likelier that there will be no platform in the market.
If size is not seen as a nuisance to the composition, but as a value added, the results
change drastically. We can write the usage function as qR = v(q1 + q2) + n(s1q1 + s2q2).
With n normalized to 1, the r of section 3 now reads as r = v+s1
v+s2 or r = v+ss2
v+s2 .
Proposition 4.4 If size generates a positive e®ect on usage, then the platform always
o®ers both types. If the size di®erence is large enough, then the small advertisement is
o®ered for free. (If v = 0, then only large ads will be o®ered.)
Since r = v+ss2
v+s2 and 0 · s < 1, for every combination between v ¸ 0 and s2 ¸ 0,
it holds that s · r < 1. If we have a look at ¯gure 1 again, then we see that the only
possible solutions are the full coverage and the di®erentiated solution.
4.3 Endogenous Size Decision
In our analysis, we treated size as exogenous, which gave us a good insight in the interplay
between r and s. In reality, however, platforms can choose the size of the advertisements.
Since we assumed that there are no costs in the model, platforms will set the level param-
eter s2 of the advertisements as high as possible. It is more interesting to investigate the
choice of s (for a given s2). Except for the special cases r = 0 or r = 1, the pro¯t maxi-
mizing monopolist sets s = 0, i.e. it reduces the persuasive role of the small advertiser as
much as possible. The pro¯t maximizing monopolist implements solution 3, i.e. it o®ers
readers a directory with all potential advertisers (q1 + q2 = 1). It o®ers two possibilities
to readers: a large ad that attracts readers, or a small ad that attracts no readers. The
latter is o®ered for free10.
Proposition 4.5 If a pro¯t maximizing monopolist can choose the size of the advertise-
ments, it makes the large advertisement as large as possible and the small advertisement
as small as possible. It o®ers readers a directory with all potential advertisers.
This proposition has an important corollary in the debate whether a government should
impose a universal service provision constraint. A universal service provision exists in the
White Pages (people's directory)11. It says that everyone has the right to be included in
the directory for free12. Such a constraint is not present for the Yellow Pages, though in
10Note that in solution 3, q1 is always o®ered for free, even if s > 0.
11There are three generally accepted telephone directories: White Pages, Yellow Pages and Grey Pages.
The ¯rst type contains an alphabetical list of persons, with address and telephone number. The directory
is divided in regions. Yellow Pages is synonymous with a business directory. It classi¯es ¯rms by their
business type or goods or services provided. Grey Pages are less known. These are so-called reverse
telephone directories where one can browse the numbers and ¯nd the associated customer details. The
latter was mostly used by emergency services, phone companies, law enforcement, and public libraries. All
types are found online nowadays; it is likely that the less pro¯table printed White and Grey Pages will
vanish ¯rst.
12See Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal
service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service
Directive).
13Figure 4: Relative prices (p =
p1
p2). Left panel: r=0.5, right panel: r=1000
every country we examined, publishers include ¯rms for free. This basic listing is as small
as possible (one line) and contains only address and telephone number.
Corollary 4.6 A universal service provision constraint is not necessary in Yellow Pages,
since a pro¯t maximizing publisher will always choose to open the directory for all potential
advertisers.
The main reason why it might be necessary to implement a universal service provision
in White Pages, but not in Yellow Pages, is the distribution of pro¯ts per view. For a
people's directory, this pro¯t is nearly zero, while businesses can easier generate pro¯t from
being contacted. In other words, in White Pages, there is not enough advertisers that can
cross-subsidize the less pro¯table types (see also the discussion on price discrimination in
section 4.4).
If we add more advertisement categories in our model, as is the case in actual Yellow
Pages, then the likely result would be that the largest advertisement is as large as possible,
the smallest as small as possible. This is similar to the quality degradation models of Mussa
& Rosen (1978), Maskin & Riley (1984) and Besanko, Donnenfeld & White (1988). In
these models, a monopolist deteriorates the quality o®ered to the groups with the lowest
willingness to pay for quality. If a regulator judges a mere listing as a product with too low
quality, it can still implement regulatory corrections, such as minimum quality standards
though this is not always welfare improving (Besanko, Donnenfeld & White 1988).
4.4 Price discrimination
If an advertisement of size one costs one euro, then we would expect that an advertisement
of twice the size would cost less than two euro. If this does not hold, every advertiser can
buy two advertisements and obtain the same e®ect. This phenomenon is well-described
in microeconomics and explains why the bundle costs less than the sum of the individual
parts. Busse & Rysman (2005) ¯nd the existence of this second degree price discrimination
and link it to competition. If there are more platforms in the market, then the price
discrimination is larger, i.e. large ads are relatively cheaper vis-µ a-vis small ads.
14Using the model, we can have a look at the price ratio in function of the size ratio.
We note that the absolute size (s2) has no in°uence on prices. Prices are only determined
by the size di®erence (s) and the information di®erence (r).
Proposition 4.7 If both types are o®ered, then large advertisers always pay more per
view than small advertisements. There is a cross-subsidization from large advertisers to
small advertisers.
The reason behind this cross-subsidization is that, in the case two types are o®ered,
the relative contribution of small advertisements to usage is larger than their visibility
(r > s).
Figure 4 shows the curvature, under r < 1 (left panel) and r > 1 (right panel). On
the horizontal axes is the ratio of size (s = s1
s2). On the vertical axes, you ¯nd p =
p1
p2, the
ratio of prices. If there is second degree price discrimination, we would expect a price ratio
above the 45 degree line. In both situations, we observe the reverse: if the size di®erence
is maximal (s=small), then p1 = 0 and therefore p = 0. The ratio gradually increases
towards 1 when the size is the same.
One of the reasons why we don't ¯nd price discrimination is that we impose that
advertisers buy at most one ad. Hence it is not possible to substitute a large ad by several
small ads. Multiple advertisements are seldom observed in Yellow Pages, though this does
not tell anything about the possibility. In sum, our model abstracts from the second degree
price discrimination observed in Yellow Pages. On the contrary, the e®ects we investigate
predict relative higher prices for the large ads.
4.5 Results for a Ramsey Planner
We contrast the optimal quantities of the private monopoly with a public monopoly plat-
form that maximizes welfare under a break-even constraint. Therefore, it takes into ac-
count the welfare of readers and advertisers. The welfare of the readers is equal to the
sum of the net utilities (see equation 1). The welfare of the advertisers is also the sum
of the net utilities and consists of two parts: small advertisers and large advertisers (see
equation 4). ® and ¯ are parameters that present the importance of advertiser welfare
versus reader welfare. The objective function of the Ramsey planner reads:
W = ®WA + ¯WR (9)
We impose the same restrictions as in the private monopoly case: q1;q2 ¸ 0 and q1+q2 · 1.
Proposition 4.8 A welfare maximizing monopolist will always o®er its advertisements
for free and fully cover the market, though it o®ers only one type. The platform will o®er
only small ads if r < ½ ´
s2®+R¯
ss2®+R¯; only large ads if r ¸ ½.
Note that if the Ramsey planner cares only about readers (® = 0), then ½ = 1. If
he cares only about advertisers (¯ = 0), then ½ = 1
s. If r < 1 or r > 1
s, then there is
no con°icting interest between readers and advertisers: the optimal solution is the same.
But if 1 < r < 1
s, then the Ramsey planner has to disappoint either the readers or the
advertisers. This can be seen in ¯gure 5.
15Figure 5: Optimal welfare solutions in the r-s-space. Between brackets, the optimal values
for q1 and q2 are shown.
If a Ramsey planner can choose the size endogenously (see section 4.3, then he chooses
s = 0 if r > ½ ´
s2®+R¯
ss2®+R¯ and s = 1 otherwise. In other words, s = 0 is implemented if
q2 = 1, s = 1 if q1 = 1.
4.6 Competition
We assumed the market structure is a monopoly, i.e. there is a single platform. We can
examine what happens if two or more platforms enter the market within the context of
the framework introduced.
Suppose that users singlehome, i.e. they use at most one platform to perform their
searches. Competition will maximize the utility of the users. Therefore, platforms will
o®er only one ad type and give it away for free. If there exist an in¯nitesimally small entry
cost, then the incumbent monopoly stays a monopoly but it makes no longer pro¯ts13.
Proposition 4.9 If users singlehome and an in¯nitesimally small entry cost exist, then
the incumbent monopolist becomes a contested monopolist. He will only o®er the adver-
tisement type that readers like most and will provide it for free.
This proposition is partly driven by the fact that users are homogenous (except for
their opportunity cost). Therefore, they all choose the platform with the largest gross
utility. This result can change if heterogeneous users are introduced.
Note that competition causes the contested monopolist to implement solutions that
are similar to the welfare solutions.
Corollary 4.10 If the monopoly is contested, then it implements the optimal quantities
that prevail under welfare optimizations. This does not hold if 1 < r <
s2®+R¯
ss2®+R¯. In this
case, it o®ers the optimal welfare solution for readers only, but not for total welfare.
13If there is no entry cost, results depend on how users decide using a certain platform or not when
utility is exactly the same. If the market is split evenly among the platforms, there will be several platforms
that all o®er exactly the same directory.
16This corollary can easily be explained by observing ¯gure 5. Since we assume that
readers singlehome, competition is focused on this side of the market. Since readers pay
no price, the only option is to maximize welfare for them, leading the monopolist to
implement always the reader welfare solution. The only con°ict zone of reader welfare
and total welfare is when 1 < r <
s2®+R¯
ss2®+R¯. Again, this result can be altered too, e.g.
when singlehoming on the advertisement side is introduced.
4.7 Further Research
In this section, we discuss some future avenues that might improve the model we introduced
above. We also suggest examples where our framework might apply.
Costs If a ¯rm produces two goods with di®erent quality, it is common to assume that
production costs will be di®erent. Normally, it will be costlier to produce the high quality
product. Therefore, costs can also be one of the drivers of the platform decision to o®er
one or two types, and in which quantities. We excluded costs by setting them equal to
zero for two reasons. First, we want to know the platform decision on quantities in a
market with readers that hold double preferences and advertisers who self select their
type. Introducing costs would add little to the model; but, it makes it more di±cult to
disentangle the reader and advertiser e®ects. Second, introducing costs complicates the
mathematical computation and would make the model intractable. It is possible to solve
a model with costs numerically, but this does not add novel insights from what we could
see.
Congestion The visibility of ads remains unchanged if the number of ads increases.
This means that there is no congestion e®ect or push away e®ect of other advertisers. It
is unlikely that this holds in reality. We would expect that the chance of a look is reduced
by an increase in advertisements14. This extension captures a negative own side e®ect.
The two-sided market literature towards congestion, or own-side e®ects, is mixed.
Some articles ignore congestion, such as Rochet & Tirole (2003). They assume that both
sides of the market always interact once, irrespective the number of agents on each side.
This means that a potential congestion e®ect is absent. Other authors put congestion at
the heart of their exposition. Belle°amme & Toulemonde (2009) investigate how negative
intra-group externalities in°uence the potential of a for-pro¯t platform to enter successfully
in a market where the two sides are already trading on a non-pro¯t platform. The for-pro¯t
platform enters by subsidizing one side and charging the other15. They show that entry
is only possible if this externality is intermediate. Church & Gandal (1992) argue that
software providers weigh the network e®ect (cross-group externality) with the competition
e®ect of more agents on their side of the market, generating a lower chance of being seen
14This congestion e®ect is widely documented in the advertisment literature. As Comanor & Wilson
(1974) put it: \To the extent that the advertising of others creates noise in the market, one must shout
louder to be heard, so that the e®ectiveness of each advertising message declines as the aggregate volume
of industry advertising increases."
15While most articles do not allow for negative prices, subsidizing one side and charging the other side
is a strategy very well suited for two-sided platforms. Caillaud & Jullien (2003) discuss these divide &
conquer strategies and the e±ciency of the resulting equilibria.
17or chosen. The same question pops up in the empirical paper of Tucker & Zhang (2008):
should platforms announce the number of sellers or not? On the one hand, a high number
of sellers signals that there are also a high number of buyers (cross-group externality). On
the other hand, it signals harsher competition for these buyers (congestion or own-side
e®ect).
Theoretically such a congestion e®ect can easily be operationalized in our model by
making the look functions L1 and L2 dependent on the quantities. The problem is sim-
ilar to adding costs: by adding two or four additional parameters the model becomes
intractable.
Other Applications Another interesting avenue for further research is to apply the
framework to other markets. These markets should have the following in common with
Yellow Pages. There should be two distinctly di®erent demand sides that value each other's
presence. One side can access the platform under di®erent forms and it is important that
they can self-select their type. The other side values one type over another in the direct
comparison, but potentially values them di®erently on their contribution to the platform.
One example is a shopping street. Consider a shopping street as a platform that
connects buyers with shopkeepers. Assume now that shops are di®erentiated by their
display windows. Shops with large windows are more interesting to shopkeepers because
they have a larger chance to be visited. It is a priori unclear whether buyers prefer small
or large windows. Buyers can have a double preference for the size of the windows. On the
one hand, a shop with a large window is more attractive than a shop with a small window
(persuasion e®ect). On the other hand, if a buyer considers the entirety of shops, i.e. the
shopping street, the large windows might be relatively annoying because they reduce the
overall visibility and make the shopping street considerably longer (aggregation e®ect).
Similar to the Yellow Pages example, the equilibrium number of shops with large and
small windows can be described by parameters r and s, at least if there is one platform
that controls all the shops in a certain area16.
Another example might be a dating event. Suppose that men and women are looking
for a partner. Women are not charged. Men are charged but they can choose out of two
types: they can appear at the event in suit or casual wear. If they compare them directly,
women prefer men in suits over casually dressed men. But when they consider to go to
the dating event or not, they might prefer an event with more casual men, because it
means that they don't have to dress formally themselves. Again, the potential di®erence
between direct comparison and contribution to the entirety of the platform might drive
the decision of the platform to di®erentiate or not.
5 An Empirical Investigation into the Yellow Pages Indus-
try
Since our results crucially depend on the relation between the informative and persuasive
characteristics (r and s), it is interesting to document them for the industry that drives the
16While this is not so likely in an older city, it might be true in a shopping mall or newly developed area.
For the implications of monopoly versus dispersed ownership of shops, see Nocke, Peitz & Stahl (2007).
18theoretical model. Therefore, we measure r and reconcile the ¯ndings with the theoretical
model.
First, we describe the main characteristics of the industry and the data. Then we
discuss the identi¯cation of the two sides of the market and we present the results. We
conclude with a comparison of our empirical and theoretical results.
5.1 Industry Characteristics
When a printer in Cheyenne, Wyoming, United States, ran out of white paper, yellow
paper was used instead (Kane, Anzovin & Podell 2006). Invented by accident in 1883,
Yellow Pages became a universal expression for telephone directories. Yellow Pages are
still big business today. The total Yellow Pages revenues worldwide are estimated at
30.9 billion US dollar in 2008 (Kelsey 2009). Yellow Pages attract 5.2 % of the global
advertising market and employ 82300 people, nearly half of them are sales representatives.
Print media are in turmoil everywhere in the world, and also the print Yellow Pages
do not escape the crisis. Yellow Pages companies hold out relatively well in 2008, with
revenues declining only 2.3% vis-µ a-vis 2007, but share prices nosedived at the end of the
¯rst decennium of the third millennium. If we compare the shares of the beginning of 2010
with the beginning of 2005, Seat (Italy) lost 99.7% of its price. Yell (UK) lost 91% and
Pages Jaunes (France) 56%.
The reason for this decline, besides worldwide ¯nancial problems, is clear cut: the
internet. In 2008, Yellow Pages companies got 85% of their revenues from their print
division and 15% from online outlets. It is likely that the print edition will vanish, though
the decline is slowed by two facts17. First, Yellow Pages are still seen as more reliable and
extensive than online search engines. Second, ¯rms are loyal to Yellow Pages, helped by
an extensive sales force.
While the online market is characterized by many players, most European markets
for print Yellow Pages are monopolies. In Europe, 70% of the countries has only one
player in print18. Some countries have two publishers. These countries include the bigger
countries (UK, Spain), Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland) and alpine
countries (Austria, Switzerland). A notable exception is Germany which has more than
twenty active companies. We can expect further consolidation as was recently the case in
the Netherlands (merger approved in 2008)19.
All Yellow Pages worldwide have the same appeal. Yellow Pages classify every busi-
ness in di®erent categories according to the goods or services it sells, such as plumbers,
lawyers and swimming pool builders. Within each category, there are three main types of
advertisements. The largest group is the free listings, which contains the basic information
such as address and telephone number. The second largest group is the in column adver-
tisements: small ads that ¯t into a directory column and add company details such as a
17The Economist, Dial I for internet, May 22nd 2008
18Data collected from the EADP website (EADP.org). EADP is the European Association of Directory
and Database Publishers and coordinates most European Directory Publishers. We counted for each coun-
try the number of publishers in the category Telecommunication Directories that publish print directories.
For most countries, the market structure is not monopolistic if one considers the market for internet Yellow
Pages.
19NMa Decision 6246, case European Directories { Truvo Nederland
19Table 1: Variables: summary statistics
Variable Mean Std.
Quantity Persuasive Ad 20937 10955
Quantity Informational Ad 96805 67842
Quantity Free Ad 657706 694509
Price Persuasive Ad 1622 1092
Price Informational Ad 310 199
Usage Penetration 0.40 0.12
Internet Penetration 0.29 0.17
Circulation 5807407 2423109
Population Density 213 137
In°ation (Index=100 in 2000) 101 8
Education 0.61 0.20
Income per Capita 26038 5511
url, opening hours or brand logo. The third type is the large ads. These advertisements
span more than one column and contain besides additional information also persuasive
content such as pictures and slogans.
Below, we describe the data, discuss the relevance of the advertisement types and
present the results of our empirical study on Yellow Pages.
5.2 Data
To test the mutual e®ect of usage and advertisements in Yellow Pages, the ¯rst thing we
need are data on usage and ads. Data on usage and advertisements are rare, even for
those who advertise. Therefore, we contacted several companies to collect data.
We received book level data on advertising, i.e. quantities, list prices and real prices.
The latter is important because it is common practice to give a discount o® the price. This
creates a gap between list prices and real prices. Since advertisers decide on real prices
and not on list prices, we use real prices in the investigation.
Considering usage, we have book level data on distribution, but surveys on book usage
are only available at the country level. To approximate the number of users, we multiply
the percentage of people frequently using the book with the circulation in a certain area.
Because the lack of detailed usage data, we carry out our analysis on country level and
not on book level.
We also have data on country characteristics which are used as control variables. These
data are obtained from international sources, such as IMF, OECD and Eurostat.
The sample includes 5 European countries. Those countries are relatively homogenous
in population and market structure. It is dominated by countries with a single market
player. In two countries, there is some competition, e.g. from local city directories, but we
treat those countries as monopolies too. The earliest data point is 1995, the latest 2006.
Since the data is compiled from di®erent sources, we often lack data for the complete
time span; i.e. the data set is an unbalanced panel. The statistics of the variables are
summarized in table 1.
205.3 Identi¯cation
Reader Side Most users pick up the Yellow Pages to ¯nd a particular company or
a particular good or service. If the directory is used to ¯nd a company which is already
known to the user, then this is labeled as known search. If the directory is used to ¯nd new
suppliers, then this is unknown search. The distinction between both types of look-ups
can have a substantial impact on usage.
At one extreme, one might argue that the users only value \raw" information: the
name and phone number of each supplier, be it classi¯ed by the category of the good or
service that is supplied. In such a setting, it even might be the case that the users would
pay for receiving a well classi¯ed directory that alphabetically lists all the suppliers in a
certain category. This would be the case when each consumer is in a satisfactory or even
optimal relationship with a certain supplier. The directory then is an ideal instrument for
retrieving the coordinates of the particular supplier a consumer wants to patronize. But
it merely serves the \administrative" purpose of an organized inventory of one's business
contacts. Large colored ads °oating around then could disturb the user that is only
interested in ¯nding the coordinates of his trusted supplier. Hence these large ads might
reduce the attractiveness of the directory.
At the other extreme, the large °ashy ads in the directory serve to persuade consumers
that have no relationship with a supplier yet, or look for change. These ads aim at the
starting of a relationship with the particular supplier that uses the directory for this
purpose. In this setting, larger and °ashy ads may convey information that this type
of user is keen for. It could separate the good suppliers from the bad in a signaling
environment: the most e±cient suppliers who have substantial turnover can pay for the
larger ads, while the less e±cient or inexperienced suppliers can not. The \nuisance" then
comes from the small entries that merely provide for contact data. Since they signal no
quality, they are not looked at and hence redundant. They could be dismissed entirely
by the phone directory provider, wouldn't it be for the obligation that he needs to list
the phone numbers of all businesses in the area in the directory, for compliance with
regulations20.
In the case of the ¯rst extreme, people only use the directory as an index: only the
company name and number su±ces. In the other extreme, people use the directory to ¯nd
out the reputation of a company: only persuasive ads count. But perhaps there is also a
category in between: informative ads. Users do not search only for the telephone number,
but also for more information about a company, i.e. fax number, e-mail or web address,
opening hours or mobile number. Besides, it can also be interesting to have additional
information about the activities of the company. If one is are looking for a replacement of
one's central heating, when looking at the category central heating, from a simple list of
companies and telephone numbers, one can not ¯nd out whether a supplier is specialized in
gas heaters or oil-¯red central heating. An informative ad can provide more information.
We can model Yellow Pages as a usage generating market. By choosing the right
amounts of quantities, a platform manages to create look-ups for the advertisers. One
20Note that these regulations in Europe only include White Pages, not Yellow Pages. See the discussion
in section 4.3.













If we take logs, then we obtain:
ln(U) = ¯ + ¯0 lnQ0 + ¯1 lnQ1 + ¯2 lnQ2 +
X
¯i lncontroli (11)
We will estimate this equation in 5.4.
Usage is captured by the percentage of people answering yes on the survey question
\Have you used the printed Yellow Pages last month?". These are considered regular
users of the directory. To count the number of persuasive ads, we add up the larger
advertisements with logo or graphic. The informational ads are smaller ads that still ¯t
into one column. These ads are in the within category alphabetical list of companies.
Large persuasive ads are always accompanied by a regular entry in the alphabetical list,
with a reference to the ad (e.g. see also advertisement on previous page). We don't have
data on the free listings, i.e. what companies get if they don't advertise, but we can
approach them by subtracting the total number of ads of the total number of companies
in a country.
Advertiser Side Rysman (2004) treats ads as a homogeneous service and explains the
amount or volume of advertising chosen by an individual business, but not the type.
Equilibrium is reached when two o®setting network e®ects keep each other in balance. On
the one hand, more advertising leads to increased usage of the directory, i.e. users like ads
in Yellow Pages unlike what seems to be the case in other media. And since advertisers
like eyeballs, they buy more advertising as usage increases. This is the positive feedback
loop that links the two sides of the market. A countervailing force exists because of the
negative network e®ect of congestion that takes place when too much advertising crowds
a category: an overwhelming number of large ads for plumbers running over several pages
of a directory is not likely the medium that still another plumber will choose to list his
services in. The two e®ects taken together lead to directories in which not every business
decides to buy ad space.
As noticed above however, the type of ad that is requested by advertisers can be quite
di®erent and hence this can result in a di®erent impact regarding the network e®ects just
mentioned. Large ads may attract more potential customers, but are perhaps annoying
for users. At the same time they trigger the possibility that another business' ad becomes
unnoticed or that trade is diverted rather than created.
The small ads on the other hand probably convince fewer potential clients. But because
they contain additional information in a condensed and surveyable way, they probably
contribute more to the usage of the directory. By this, they might in°ict a positive
externality on the other advertisers of the directory. At the same time they might steal
less business from the larger ads. In this respect, they might be complementary to larger
ads, and the directory that has one large and two small ads might be a better product
than the directory of the same size that is composed of two large ads.
It is not hard to understand that the providers of directories will take these di®erences
into account. The result will be inter alia a di®erent pricing strategy for each type of ad.
22These pricing strategies will take into account that the contribution to usage of each type
of ad is di®erent and the e®ect of the ad on reaching potential customers. The congestion
e®ect might be circumvented to some extent by including di®erent types of ads that do
not compete for the attention of the user. This leads to the claim that the di®erent types
of ads might be heterogeneous services.
Following Rysman (2004), we model the advertising site as a Cobb-Douglas function.
Similar to the usage production function, it contains the major ad type and control vari-













If we take logs, then we obtain:
lnpj = ® + ®0 lnQ0 + ®1 lnQ1 + ®2 lnQ2 + ®3 lnU +
X
®i lncontroli (13)
We will estimate this equation in 5.4.
In this price equation, the quantities are the same as in the usage equation. As ex-
plained above we prefer real prices above rate card prices. For usage, i.e. the number of
consumers, we have no direct data. Therefore, we approach this number by multiplying
the percentage of people regularly using the directory with the circulation. This may lead
to an underestimation of the number of users, because directories are distributed to fam-
ilies which consist usually of more than one person. Robustness checks show though that
multiplying this usage ¯gure with average family size does not change the results below.
5.4 Results
Reader side Do users value a directory mostly for its listings, small ads or large ads?
In this section we test this question and present the results.
Because we work with an unbalanced panel, consisting of 5 di®erent countries, we use
a least squares estimator with ¯xed e®ects. These estimation technique allows to control
possible characteristics of particular countries - even without measuring them, as long as
those characteristics do not change over time.
The number of observations is quite limited, though our results appear to be quite
robust to other speci¯cations of the model (see Appendix). We apply the three stage least
squares methodology on these equations, which allows us to estimate a system of equations.
Rysman (2004) proposed instrumental variables in his study on the Yellow Pages in the
United States. In the usage equation, the advertisement level is instrumented by the
number of people covered by a directory. In the advertisement equation, he instruments
usage by the people that recently moved. For advertisements he uses the earnings level
in a county, because this approximates the hourly wage and can be seen as a cost shifter.
We do not apply these instruments because we have only a limited number of observations
and we do not have the necessary data to instrument.
As can be seen from table 3, the coe±cients of the quantities of the small advertisements
and the free listings are signi¯cantly di®ering from zero. The coe±cient of small ads is
quite large: increasing the number of small ads with 1 percent increases the number of
users with 2 percent. Large ads seem to have no e®ect on usage.
23Table 2: Results of 3SLS regression
Usage Price Small Ads Price Large Ads
Quantity Index Ads 0.391 -0.003 0.227
(3.86)*** -0.07 (5.23)***
Quantity Small Ads 2.166 -0.764 2.138
(2.72)*** (2.47)** (7.06)***
Quantity Large Ads 0.03 -0.141 -1.288
-0.04 -0.62 (5.56)***
Internet 0.087 0.368 -0.021
-0.21 (2.82)*** -0.16








Constant -51.764 9.184 -5.779
(2.29)** (2.93)*** (1.83)*
Observations 24 24 24
R-squared
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
These results indicate that readers value most the small ads in the book, but list-
ings (=only name and telephone number) are also appreciated. Large advertisements are
considered as annoying and do not a®ect usage. While large advertisements can be inter-
esting for advertisers because they attract a lot of eyeballs, users are not interested in the
additional (persuasive) elements.
Advertiser side In the same table 3, the results for the price equation are given. Since
price, quantity and usage are given in logs, we can easily interpret the coe±cients. As
expected, both ad categories have a negative and signi¯cant own elasticity.
Higher usage increases the willingness to pay in the small ads category, though it is
not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in the large ad category. The same phenomenon pops
up if we consider the cross term (quantity of other advertising category). In the large ads
price equation, the quantity of small ads has a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on the price.
This means that more small ads increase the willingness to pay for large ads. The amount
of large ads has no e®ect on the price of small ads. The quantity of free ads a®ects the
price of large ads positively.
The fact that internet penetration has a signi¯cantly positive e®ect on the price of small
ads, might be related to the fact that the internet is not a substitute, but a complement
for additional information, e.g. it would be of no use to add a mail and website address
if no users had internet access. As explained above, internet might rather be a substitute
for large ads, because it serves the same needs: in depth search for a product or service.
Reconciling the empirical and the theoretical results With our empirical results
in mind, it is interesting to look back to the theoretical model. The most interesting
24application of these results comes from the usage equation. If we add a third advertisement
category to the theoretical model, say q0 (which is associated with s0 < s1, then we get
results for estimations of r0, r1 and r2. Point estimates for these parameters are 0.39,
2.16 and 0.03 respectively. If we ignore r0 for a moment, the estimates of r1 and r2 can
be merged to a r estimate. Since r = r1
r2, r = 72. One can wonder, if ratio is really that
large, why is q2 still in the directory? The answer can be seen in ¯gure 1. With a high r,
the result depends on the value of s. If s is smaller than 0.25, then q1 is o®ered for free; if
s is larger than 0.752, then only q1 is o®ered. Between 0.25 and 0.75 both quantities are
o®ered and a positive price occurs in the market.
Even if no one likes the large advertisements, Yellow Pages will still o®er them as long
as the di®erence in views is large enough. If our models extends to three categories, then if
the listing is small enough, then it will be o®ered for free and the whole market is covered.
If the large advertisement is substantially larger than the small advertisement, then all
three advertisements will be o®ered. In most directories, the free listing is only one line,
which ¯ts with our prediction that, if platforms can choose the size di®erence, they will
make it as large as possible.
We don't have size information for all observations, though rough estimations show
that the size of the average small advertisement is between 0.04 and 0.11 of size of the
average large advertisement. This is relatively small but still a lot larger than the listing.
The average listing is between 0.002 and 0.006 of the size of a large advertisement. With
the assumptions of our model, this size di®erence would lead to a solution where all
advertisers are included and the smallest advertisement is given away for free. Our model
does not incorporate the possibility of a third advertisement type, which probably explains
why small advertisements are paid in reality.
It is harder to reconcile the estimation of the advertisement equation with the theo-
retical model. The reason is that we have not modeled the potential congestion e®ect in
the directory. We have assumed that the number of rival advertisements have no in°uence




dq2 = 0. What we do model
is the self-selection e®ect. Therefore, an increase in the amount of small advertisement
should not only decrease the price the small ads, but also of the large ads. We do ¯nd
the negative e®ect of an increased quantity on the own price, but we do not ¯nd an e®ect
on the cross price. A shift in large ads has no e®ect on small ads, while small ads have a
positive e®ect on large ads. The theoretical model falls short in explaining this sign.
6 Conclusion
Yellow Pages readers do like small advertisements, but place no value at large advertise-
ments. An empirical investigation on Yellow Pages in ¯ve European countries shows this
quite clearly. It then might seem puzzling why 18% of the ¯rms in our sample buy a large
ad.
One of the reasons is given by the theoretical model we introduced: the discrepancy
between what readers value when they compare ad types and when they look at the entirety
of the platform. We relate this comparison to the persuasive role of advertisements and
the valuation of the entire directory to the informative role. If large ads are su±ciently
valued by users, then the platform will choose to o®er only large ads to advertisers. If
25the reverse holds, then small and large ads will be o®ered except when the persuasion
di®erence between small and large ads is small. If the di®erence is large, then every
potential advertiser is included in the directory and the small ads are o®ered for free.
If platforms can choose the size di®erence, then they maximize it and implement the
solution with full coverage in the market. This resembles reality where every ¯rm is
included for free with a mentioning as small as possible; ¯rms that want to attract more
readers have to pay for more space. If the platform has no pro¯t motives but wants to
maximize welfare, then the platform implements a corner solution: every ¯rm gets a small
ad, or every ¯rm gets a large ad; depending on the ratio of the parameters. When both are
included, we ¯nd a cross-subsidization from large ads to small ads, which is quite di®erent
from what a price discrimination story would tell.
Future research might include prices and costs on both sides and own side externalities
(congestion e®ect). It might also address competition between platforms. Further it would
be interesting to apply this model and test the results in other markets than Yellow Pages,
such as advertisement-related industries in general, shopping malls, dating events, job
agencies and auction platforms.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1 If we solve equation 7 with respect to the constraints q1;q2 ¸




























where } = (r ¡ s)2(s ¡ 1)s(¡3r2 + 6rs + s2 ¡ 4s). As can be seen in ¯gure 6, solution 4,
the di®erentiated optimum, will always be pro¯t maximizing. Though, this solution is not
always feasible. Since we have solved this model with Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we
should check whether and when these conditions hold.
The only non-zero Lagrange operator related to the constraint q1 + q2 · 1, prevails in













positive, then solution 3 should be implemented and q1 + q2 will be equal to 1. The
corresponding price p1 is equal to 0, i.e. small advertisers don't pay to be included.
The condition q1 ¸ 0 is violated if r · s, in this case solution 1 will be implemented
where q1 = 0. The other non-negativity condition q2 ¸ 0 is violated if r > s
4s¡3, in this
case solution 2 will be implemented where q2 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.3 To trace back the e®ects of R, s2, r and s, we perform a
comparative statics analysis on the equilibrium quantities of the di®erent solutions and
on the pro¯ts under the di®erent solutions.
First, we ¯nd that the derivatives under all solutions of quantity with respect to R








ds2 = 0. If we derive the equilibrium pro¯ts ¦i (with
26Figure 6: Platform pro¯t. Left panel: r=0.5, right panel: r=1000
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with ® = s2 in the case of d¦
dR and ® = R in the case of d¦
ds2. If r ¸ 0, R > 0, s2 > 0
and 0 · s < 1, then these derivatives are unambiguously positive. An increase in R or s2
always increases pro¯t.
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dr , but with the opposite sign. With the same restrictions as above, we can show
that
dq1
dr > 0 and
dq2
dr < 0 in the di®erentiated and full coverage case.









ds = 0. The derivative
dq4
1
ds is somewhat more complicated; and crosses
27the horizontal axes once in the r-space, i.e. it can be both negative and positive, depend-
ing on the value of r.









solution 1 0 0 0 0
solution 2 0 0 0 0
solution 3 > 0 0 0
solution 4 > 0 < 0 if r < ½1 0









solution 1 0 0 0 0
solution 2 0 0 0 0
solution 3 < 0 0 0
solution 4 < 0 > 0 if r < 1 0









solution 1 < > 0 >
solution 2 > > > >
solution 3 < 0 if r < 1 > < >
> 0 if r < 1
solution 4 < 0 if r < ½2 > < 0 if r < ½3 >
> 0 if r > ½2 > 0 if r > ½3
where ½1, ½2 and ½3 are parameter values above 1 where there is a switch in the comparative
statics, i.e. ½1 is the value of r for which
dq2
1
ds = 0 and mutatis mutandis the same holds
for ½2 and ½3.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 The rationale behind this proposition is similar as proposi-
tion 3.1. It can be seen as an extension or recti¯cation of this proposition. As in proposition
3.1, solution 4 is the unconstrained optimum of the problem. The same constraints apply:
q1 + q2 · 1 and q1;q2 ¸ 0.
In the case where r2 > 0 and r1 < 0, it su±ces to investigate q1 · 0 since the platform
will never set q2 · 0 or q1 + q2 · 1, even if that would be possible. The constraint q1 · 0
is violated if r · s, also for values r < 0. Therefore, the analysis is not altered.
Things are somewhat more complicated in the case where r1 > 0 and r2 < 0. The
constraint q1 ¸ 0 will never be violated since this would induce a no-usage platform. To
check whether q1 + q2 · 1 is not violated in solution 4, we have to investigate in which









1¡4s if r < 0. We






6(s¡r)(1¡s)s(r2+s¡2rs) ¸ 0 (with
} = (r ¡ s)2(s ¡ 1)s(¡3r2 + 6rs + s2 ¡ 4s)). This is violated in two r-regions: s
4s¡3 in
both cases (r < 0 and r > 0) and for all r-values if r < 0 and 3
4 < s < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 We solve the same model as in section 3, though we alter
the usage equation. Since the new usage equation can be written in a similar way as the
old usage equation, we obtain qualitatively the same results. Though, solution 1, where
(q1;q2) = (0; 2
3) is no optimal solution anymore. This solution can be replaced by solution
5, (q1;q2) = (0;0), which prevents that qR would drop below zero.
28Figure 7: Di®erent Solutions in the r ¡ s-space. Left panel: if r < 0, then r1 < 0;r2 > 0,
right panel: if r < 0, then r1 > 0;r2 < 0
Since we can rewrite the old parameters r1 and r2 as v ¡ s1 and v ¡ s2, we can
interpret the solutions in the r ¡ s-space. r is equal to v¡ss2
v¡s2 , i.e. r is determined by s
(in the graph) and v and s2 (which are ¯xed in the graph). There are two cases that
should be investigated. First, if v > s2, then both quantities are valued positively in
the usage equation. Second, if v < s2, then at least one quantity is valued negatively.
If s1 < v < s2, then small advertisements generate a positive e®ect on usage, large
advertisements generate a negative e®ect. If v < s1, then both advertisements generate a
negative e®ect and it is optimal for the platform to o®er no advertisements at all.
In ¯gure 7, the optimal solution choice is given for v > s2 (left panel) and v < s2 (right
panel). The r(s) corresponding with the s-values is given by the straight green line. In
both cases, the relative value of v versus s2 determines the slope. If v > s2, the larger v,
the °atter this line. If v < s2, the larger v, the steeper this line. As can be seen in the left
panel, the r determination crosses solution 3 and 4 (for v set twice as large as s2), but if
v was smaller, then it would have crossed solution 2 as well. If we know the value s, then
we can immediately derive from the graph which solution will prevail. The same holds for
the case v < s2. Note that if r(s) > 0, this indicates that both r1 and r2 are smaller than
zero and that no advertisements are o®ered in optimum. If r(s) < 0, then the line always
crosses the solution 2, 3 and 4. On the right panel, r(s) is drawn for v half as large as s2.


























If we derive these quantities to s2, then
dq1
ds2 > 0 and
dq2
ds2 < 0, at least in the regions where
these solutions prevail.
Proof of Proposition 4.4 We can draw the same graph as for proposition 4.2. The
r(s) corresponding with the s-values is given by the straight green line. This line always
29Figure 8: Di®erent solutions in the r-s-space.
Figure 9: Price ratios. Left panel: r=0.5, right panel: r=1000
ends in point (1,1). The starting point (0, v
v+s2) depends on the values of v and s2 and
should lie between zero and one. If v = 0, then r = s and we obtain solution 1, i.e. only
large quantities are o®ered (see the proof of proposition 3.1. In graph 8, the r(s)-line is
shown for v = 2 and s2 = 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.5 To ¯nd the solution of the private monopolist who decides
on quantities and size (s), we maximize equation 7 with respect these variables. We ¯nd
two solutions for this problem, which are equivalent to solutions 2 and 3 of the problem
in section 3.2, supplemented with a size choice of s = 1 in solution 2 and s = 0 in solution
3. Further we ¯nd that solution 3 dominates for all values of r. The only exception is
r ! 1; then the platform is indi®erent between both solutions. In sum, one can say that
s = 0 is optimal for all values of r. Moreover, it is the only solution if r2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.7 To check whether the price per view is higher for large




s1, for every solution in the relevant




s2 are plotted in ¯gure 9. On the left panel, r = 0:5,
on the right panel r = 1000. The s-values on the left hand side of the dotted line are the
relevant ones, because on the right hand side of this line only one type is o®ered in the
market.
Proof of Proposition 4.8 We solve equation 9 with the same Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
conditions as under the private monopolist, i.e. q1;q2 ¸ 0 and q1 + q2 · 1. We obtain
three groups of solutions: an unconstraint optimum, two solutions where either q1 or q2 is
zero and two solutions where q1+q2 = 1. We ¯nd further that only the Lagrange operator
related to this last solution is always binding in the region 0 < s < 1. Therefore, (1,0)
and (0,1) are the only relevant solutions to our problem.
We obtain the critical r = ½ ´
s2®+R¯
ss2®+R¯ by comparing the two welfare levels, under
the ¯rst and second solution. Equivalently we can say that a Ramsey planner implements
solution 1 if s <
s2®+R¯¡rR¯
rs2® and solution 2 otherwise. The critical values for the monop-
olist maximizing the welfare of one side of the market only, can be found easily by setting
® or ¯ equal to zero.
Proof of Proposition 4.9 Suppose that a platform would o®er a quantity combination
that does not maximize reader welfare. Then another platform can o®er a combination
that slightly improves reader welfare and the ¯rst platform will have no users and hence
no advertisers. Since there are no costs in our model, it is always feasible to o®er all
advertisements for free. If we introduce costs to our model, then the platform can never
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